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ABSTRACT
Therapidly growing net inflow of capital from abroad, mirroring the
extraordinary deterioration of the U.S. export—import balance, has played
a major role in equilibrating overall saving and investment in the United
States in the face of unprecedentedly large and persistent federal goverrimen.t
budget deficits during the l980s. As a result of this capital inflow, the
share of U.S. financial assets held by foreign investors is also growing
rapidly. If the inflow continues, the increasing relative importance of
foreign investors will in general change the equilibrium price and yield
relationships determined in U.S. markets. In particular, because foreign
investors, on average, hold far less of their portfolios in long—term debt
instruments than do American investors, the increasing share of foreign
ownership of U.S. financial assets is likely to raise the expected return
premium on long—term debt, and hence to shift the composition of U.S. financial
activity away from capital formation.
Nevertheless, the foreign capital inflow —andwith it the U.S.
export—import balance —maychange in response to a variety of possible
influences, including U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. Empirical estimates
based on reduced-form equations indicate that a tightening of U.S. fiscal
policy would significantly stimulate U.S. capital formation, and would shrink
the U.S. capital inflow (that is, improve the U.S. export—import balance) by
even more. Analogous estimates indicate that an easing of U.S. money policy
would also significantly stimulate capital formation and shrink the capital
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An escalating international imbalance, necessarily including both
real and financial aspects, has become the outstanding failing of U.S.
macroeconomic performance in the 1980s. The half—again real appreciation
of the dollar exchange rate since the beginning of the decade has severely
impaired the ability of U.S. producers to compete for export sales abroad,
or even to protect their traditional domestic markets against foreign imports..
The resulting devastation of the economy's internationally exposed sector,
including especially agriculture and manufacturing, has in turn led to
lost profits, lost jobs, and a continuing rash of actual and/or threatened
bankruptcies.
At the same time, the financing of a record trade gap by exporting
assets instead of goods and services has sharply altered traditional U.S.
financial relationships. The United States has now dissipated its net
international investment position and, on the current trajectory, will soon
become the world's leading debtor nation. Correspondingly, foreign investors
and foreign financial institutions now play a far larger role in the U.S.
financial markets than they did just a short time ago.
These problematic developments, at least in rough outline, have been
the predictable (and much predicted) consequences of the macroeconomic policy
course followed by the United States since 1981. The extraordinary combination
of personal tax cuts, an accelerated build—up of military spending, and
resistance to reductions in major non—military government spending programs
like Social Security and Medicare has led to federal budget deficits far
beyond the nation's prior peacetime experience. Meanwhile, the basic priority—2—
of monetary policy has been first to lower, and then to contain, the
economy's rate of price inflation. This fundamental fiscal—monetary
imbalance has led to unprecedentedly high real interest rates, and has
thereby helped to drive up the real dollar exchange rate. Its predictably
negative impact has fallen both on the economy's investment sector and on
the internationally competitive sector. The only real surprise has come
in the split between these two, with more of the impact falling on the
international sector (and correspondingly less on the investment sector)
than all but a few observers had predicted at the outset.
The object of this paper is to explore the implications for the U.S.
economy of the financial side of this growing international imbalance.
Section I uses basic concepts of national income accounting and balance
of payments accounting to review the role of the net foreign capital inflow
in financing the economy's stagnant net investment and swollen government
deficit. Section II then examines the likely implications of a continuation
of this inflow, at magnitudes like those of the recent past, for some time
into the future. The discussion here primarily examines the implications,
for the pricing of U.S. financial assets, of the growing share of these
assets owned by foreign investors. By contrast, Section III considers what
would happen if the United States suddenly had to make do without this
capital inflow, and includes the results of an attempt to quantify the most
important of these effects. Section IV briefly summarizes the principal
conclusions advanced in the paper.—3—
I. Capital Inf lows, Investment, and Government Deficits
The deterioration of the U.S. balance of international payments in
the l980s has been spectacular in both speed and extent. As Table 1
shows, on average during the 1970s a positive balance on services,
together with other net receipts, was just sufficient to deliver a balanced
current account despite a significant deficit on merchandise trade in the
years following the first price increase imposed by the international oil
cartel. Indeed, by the end of the decade even the merchandise trade
deficit was narrowing despite the further oil price increase imposed in 1979.
The U.S. performance thus far in the 1980s has been dramatically
different. By 1983 the trade deficit had jumped to approximately double
the level at which it had appeared to plateau during the prior half-dozen
years, and the further deterioration in 1984 alone represented almost
another doubling. Data for 1985 to date indicate yet a further deterioration,
albeit not nearly at so dramatic a pace. At the same time, the current
account first showed a massive deficit in 1983, and it too has continued
to deteriorate ever since.
The fact that producers abroad sell more goods and services to Americans
than U.S. producers sell to foreigners automatically and necessarily has
a financial counterpart. Precisely because foreign producers are selling
their goods to Americans, rather than donating them in some eleemosynary
fashion, they receive payment. That payment may occur directly in the
form of a dollar deposit on some U.S. bank remitted to the foreign seller.
Alternatively, the American buyer may pay the foreign seller in the seller's
own currency by first purchasing the needed amount of that currency in the
foreign exchange market. In either case, some foreigner —eitherthe
seller of goods or the seller of currency —thenholds an additional
dollar deposit in the amount corresponding to the U.S. import.TABLE 1
U.S.TRADE AND CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES, 1951-1985
Trade Account Current Account
Amount % of GNP Amount % of GNP
Average, 1951—60 $2.9 0.7% $0.6 0.1%
Average, 1961—70 4.1 0.7 3.3 0.5
Average, 1971—80 —10.5 -0.5 —0.4 —0.0
1971 2.6 0.3 2.3 0.2
1972 —2.3 —0.2 —1.4 —0.1
1973 —6.4 —0.5 —5.8 —0.5
1974 0.8 0.1 7.1 0.5
1975 —5.1 —0.4 2.0 0.1
1976 8.7 0.6 18.1 1.2
1977 —9.1 —0.5 4.2 0.2
1978 —30.5 —1.6 —14.5 —0.8
1979 —33.6 —1.6 —15.4 —0.7
1980 —30.3 —1.3 —1.0 —0.0
1981 —24.2 —0.9 1.9 0.1
1982 —28.4 —1.0 6.3 0.2
1983 —60.4 —1.8 —41.6 —1.3
1984 —106.2 —2.9 —101.5 —2.8
1985 —119.4 —3.1 —116.3 —3.0
Notes: Amounts in billions of dollars.
Data for 1985 are through 1985:Q2 for the trade account, and through l985:Q1
for the current account, at seasonally adjusted annual rates.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce—4—
When U.S. imports exceed U.S. exports, the amount of dollar deposits
acquired in this way by foreign holders exceeds the amount of foreign
currency deposits acquired by U.S. holders. On a net basis, therefore —
thatis, even after U.S. holders use the foreign exchange market to swap
the foreign currency they have received back into dollars —foreignholders
still have a remaining amount of dollar deposits conceptually equal to
the U.S. current account deficit. They need not continue to hold these
assets in deposit form, of course, and no individual foreigner need hold
any additional dollar assets at all. All foreign investors together, however,
must increase their net holdings of dollar assets by just the amount
by which U.S. imports exceed U.S. exports.
Table 2 illustrates this essential connection between the U.S.
export—import balance and foreign holders' net acquisition of dollar
assets by presenting the relevant data for 1984. After adjustment for
statistical discrepancy, last year's $102 billion current account deficit
in the conventional balance of payments accounts corresponded to a "net
capital flow" of -$77 billion —thatis, an excess of $77 billion in
foreign holders' accumulation of dollar assets over U.S. holders'
accumulation of assets abroad. Because of both conceptual and statistical
differences (primarily involving treatment of the statistical discrepancy,
but including other items as well) ,thecorresponding "net foreign
investment" flow in the conventional national income accounts was —$93
billion —thatis, an excess of $93 billion in foreign saving applied to
U.S. uses over American saving applied to foreign uses.
Even in an economy the size of the United States, the presence of
net capital inflows from abroad in this magnitude makes a substantial
difference for the overall balance of saving and investment. Table 3, using
national income accounting concepts, shows the U.S. balance of net savingTABLE 2
NETEXPORTSAND NET FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1984
Balance of Payments Accounts
Balance on Goods and Services — $90.1
Merchandise Exports 220.3
Other Exports 142.1
Merchandise Imports (-) -328.6
Other Imports C—) -123.9
Governments Grants Abroad (-) -8.5
Other Flows Abroad (-) -2.9
Balance on Current Account —101.5
Statistical Discrepancy 24.7
Net capital flow —76.8
U.S. assets abroad 20.4
Foreign assets in the U.S. (-) 97.3
Relationship to National Income Accounts
Balance on Goods and Services (B.P. Accounts) - $90.1
Net Gold Exports (-) 1.2
Net Capital Gains in Services Income (—) 9.1
Government Interest in Services Imports 19.8
Other Accounting Differences —4.2
Balance on Goods and Services (N.I. Accounts) —64.2
National Income Accounts
Balance on Goods and Services — $64.2
Merchandise Exports 219.2
Services Exports 145.0
Merchandise Imports C—) -325.5
Services Imports (-) -103.0
Net Transfers Abroad (-) -9.6
Government Interest Payments Abroad (-) -19.6
Net Foreign Investment —93.4
Notes: Amounts in billions of dollars.
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.TABLE 3
U.S. NET SAVING AND INVESTMENT, 1984
Total Net Saving $148.6
Net Private Saving 271.6
Personal Saving 156.1
Corporate Saving 115.4
State-Local Government Surplus 52.9
Federal Government Surplus -175.8
Total Net Investment $141.2
Net Private Domestic Investment 234.6
Fixed Investment 176.4
Inventory Accumulation 58.2
Net Foreign Investment —93•4
Statistical Discrepancy $7.4
Notes: Amounts in billions of dollars.
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.—5—
and net investment for 1984. The economy's $272 billion of net private
saving, including personal saving plus corporate retained earnings,
represented the amount that the economy's private sector as a whole made
available last year to finance new investment beyond what was necessary
just to maintain the nation's depreciating stocks of business and residential
capital. Nevertheless, because of the need to finance a $176 billion
federal government deficit, only partly offset by an aggregate $53 billion
surplus for all state and local governments, the economy's total net saving
was only $149 billion.
The economy's total net investment, which equals total net saving
except for a small statistical discrepancy,1 was therefore only $141 billion
in 1984. By contrast, net private domestic investment, including business
and residential fixed capital formation as well as business inventory
accumulation, amounted to $235 billion. The two totals were consistent
because, instead of devoting part of net saving to net investment abroad,
the United States disinvested abroad by $93 billion —thatis, accumulated
$93 billion less in assets abroad than foreign holders accumulated in the
United States. In other words, by importing more goods and services than
it exported, the United States was able to take advantage of the corresponding
net capital inflow to supplement the saving available from domestic sources.
Placed in this context, the $93 billion net capital inflow in 1984 was of
substantial importance. It has lately become fashionable in the business press
to describe this inflow from abroad as having financed more than half of the
federal government's deficit. Given the inherent fungibility of financial
flows at this level of aggregation, it would be equally correct to say
that the capital inflow had financed more than half of the nation's net
fixed capital formation —or,similarly, more than all of the U.S. business
sector's net investment in new plant and equipment.2 A less misleading-6—
description would be merely to say that the $93 billion net capital inflow
had supplemented a net domestic saving total of only $149 billion.
This massive U.S. reliance on foreign capital is unprecedented in
the twentieth century. Table 4 reviews the main movements of the U.S.
balance of net saving and investment, in a form comparable to Table 3
but stated in percentages of gross national product so as to abstract
from the economy's growth, since the 1950s. Despite substantial variation
since World War II in such factors as tax rates, price inflation, real rates
of return and income growth trends all of which could in principle affect
saving behavior —theU.S. economy's net private saving rate has remained
very steady throughout this period. Its post-war mean has been 7.2%,
with a standard deviation around the mean of only 1%, and it has displayed
no significant time trend during this period (once the data are corrected
for cyclical variation) .Thesaving rate has varied in a modestly
procyclical pattern, however, and this variation accounts for the slightly
higher than average level during the l960s and (in part) for the distinctly
lower than average level during the early l980s.
Table 4 makes clear the extraordinary stance of U.S. fiscal policy
during the l980s. In contrast to a nearly balanced federal budget on
average throughout the l950s and l960s, and a deficit equal to less than 2%
of gross national product on average during the 1970s, the federal budget
deficit has now been approximately 5% of gross national product —above
the prior record for any peacetime year —ineach of the last four consecutive
years. By contrast, state and local governments have increasingly run budget
surpluses during this period, as current pension surpluses have grown faster than
operating deficits. With net private saving slightly lower than the historical
average, and the federal deficit ballooning far beyond the aggregate state—


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































during the 1980s have fallen far short of prior U.S. norms. Instead of the
typical 7% rate that characterized the prior three decades, total net
investment has averaged only 3.1% of gross national product during 1981-85,
and only 2.5% during the last four years.
Increasingly since 1982, however, a negative net foreign investment
position has cushioned the impact of this change on the U.S. economy's
domestic capital formation. U.S. net foreign investment was last positive
that is, the United States last devoted more saving to foreign uses than
the saving it imported from abroad for domestic uses —in1981. Since
then the nation's net foreign investment has been negative, and increasingly
so each year as the current account balance has deteriorated.
To be sure, the 1980s have hardly been a banner period for capital
formation in the United States, even with the aid of so much foreign saving.
Net private domestic investment has averaged only 4.4% of gross national
product during this period, well below the 6-7% range typical of the prior
three decades. Nor has business investment in plant and equipment fared
particularly well (presumably at the expense of homebuilding), despite the
tax incentives legislated in l98l. The absence of greater strength in
business fixed capital formation, in turn, has probably played at least some
role in disappointing hopes that the U.S. economy's productivity growth might
show renewed strength in the 198O. Nevertheless, even this meager
investment performance would presumably have been still more disappointing
in the absence of the swelling foreign capital inflow.
The continuing and increasing reliance on foreign capital to finance
its massive government deficit and modest net capital formation raises
two sets of issues for the United States: First, what consequences follow
if the capital inflow continues? Second, what if it doesn't? Sections II
and III, respectively, go on to address these questions.—8—
II. WhatIfthe Capital Inflow Continues?
Financial flows represent changes in stocks of assets owned and
liabilities owed. As Table 2 shows during 1984 foreign holders collectively
accumulated $97 billion of assets in the United States, including debt
liabilities issued by U.S. borrowers as well as equity claims and real estate,
while U.S. holders accumulated only $20 billion of analogous assets abroad.
These one-year totals, though certainly substantial enough, are still
but one year's contribution to the building over time of assets internationally
owned and liabilities internationally owed. If U.S. imports of goods and
services continue to fall short of U.S. exports by anything like the
deficit experienced in 1984, these internationally relevant asset and
liability stocks will continue to grow, not just absolutely but in
comparison to the size of the U.S. economy.
Table 5 shows the evolution since 1970 of the stock of assets abroad
owned by U.S. holders, the stock of assets in the United States owned by
foreign holders, and the US. "net international investment position"
consisting of the difference between the two. These asset stocks (measured
in dollars) grow from year to year not only with the capital flows that
finance the U.S. balance of payments but also as a result of valuation
changes due to either asset prices or exchange rales. In 1984, for example,
U.S. holdings of assets abroad increased by $21 billion as a result of a
$20 billion capital flow, enhanced by $6 billion due to increases in
foreign asset prices (and other statistical adjustments), and reduced by
$5 billion due to the falling value of most foreign currencies in dollar
terms. Similarly, in 1984 foreign asset holdings in the United States
increased by $99 billion as a result of a $97 billion capital flow, enhanced
by $2 billion due to increases in U.S. asset prices.TABLE 5
U.S.NET INVESTMENT POSITION, 1970-1984
U.S. Assets Foreign Assets Net U.S.
Abroad in the U.S. Position
1970 $165.4 $106.9 $58.5
1975 295.1 220.9 74.2
1980 606.9 500.8 106.0
1981 719.9 579.0 140.7
1982 839.0 692.0 147.0
1983 893.8 787.6 106.2
1984 914.7 886.4 28.2
Notes: Imounts in billions of dollars, at yearend.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.—9—
The most dramatic development of the 1980s documented in Table 5
is the virtual elimination, in just two years, of the positive U.S. net
international investment position. During the nineteenth century the
United States, in a pattern that has since become typical of many
developing countries, financed its initial industrialization with large
inflows of foreign capital. Once its industrial development was under
way, however, the United States began to export capital rather import it.
By 1914 this new capital outflow had sufficiently accumulated to render
American holdings of assets abroad greater than foreign holdings of assets
in the United States —thatis, to give the United States a positive net
international investment position. A continuing excess of U.S. accumulation
abroad over foreign accumulation in the United States, on average over
nearly seven decades, brought the U.S. net international investment position
to $147 billion (nearly 5% of U.S. gross national product) by yearend 1982.
The capital flows required to finance just the last two years of U.S.
imports in excess of U.S. exports reduced this net position to only $28
billion by yearend 1984. By yearend 1985, the net position will be
negative, and at current rates it will grow to -$400-500 billion (in today's
prices) by the end of the decade.
The dissipation of the U.S. net international investment position —
and,still worse, the continuing movement of the United States into net
debtor status —bearspotentially worrisome implications for the freedom
of U.S. economic policy and for the nation's ability to achieve a rising
standard of living. At the most obvious level, net debtor status implies
the need not just to service debt obligations owed abroad but to nurture
foreign lenders' confidence in the nation's ability to meet its obligations,
and hence their willingness to hold them. To be sure, the situation of
the United States would be unlike that of many of today's troubled debtor-10-
nations,in that the great majority of U.S. liabilities are denominated in
the United States' own currency. Even so, a net external debt of $400—500
billion (in constant prices) would represent 11-14% of 1990 gross national
product if the U.S. economy achieved an average 3% real growth for the remainder
of the decade, or roughly 100% of 1990 total exports if the export share of
total output remains as it is today.
Moreover, even apart from the strains that would be implied by the sheer
magnitude of the debt service obligation due to such a large net external
debt position, it is worrisome that, in contrast to the experience of prior
years, the recent accumulation of U.S. assets held abroad has been almost entirely
due to private rather than official (that is, government) holders. During
1971-78, for example, foreign official holders accumulated a total of $147 billion
of U.S. assets, while foreign private holders accumulated a total of
$118 billion of U.S. assets. During 1979-84 the foreign official and foreign
private accumulations have totalled $26 billion and $489 billion, respectively.
As a result, private holders accounted for 78% of the $886 billion of U.S.
assets held abroad as of yearend 1984. On the other side of the account, it
is also worrisome that almost half of all U.S. holdings of assets abroad
($443 billion out of $915 billion at yearend 1984) now consist of bank loans
to foreign borrowers, many of whom are unable to meet their own obligations
except in the highly artificial sense implied by the recent widening circle
of reschedulings.
Even if foreign holders continue not to question the creditworthiness
of U.S. obligors, so that neither actual defaults nor crises of confidence
disrupt financial flows and, consequently, economic activity, the net
debtor status of the United States poses a significant challenge to the
nation's ability to achieve increases over time in its standard of living.-11-
As the direct connection between net capital inflows and the balance
of payments on goods and services suggests, a nation's net debtor or
creditor status determines its ability to consume (or invest) in relation
to what it produces. If asset returns are approximately equalized in
international markets, a creditor nation earns a postive net flow of
income by virtue of owning more than it owes internationally. It may
then apply that income to finance consumption in excess of domestic
production. As Table 1 shows, on average during the l970s the United
States maintained an approximately balanced current account, despite a
significant trade deficit, because of service income including earnings on
tts relatively large positive net international investment position. As
recently as 1982, the United States ran a $6 billion current account surplus,
despite a $28 billion trade deficit, almost entirely because of earning $85
billion on assets abroad while having to pay only $55 billion on foreign
holdings of U.S. assets.
As the U.S. net international investment position has eroded since
1982, so too has the positive net flow of income earned on international
asset holdings. In 1984 the United States earned $87 billion on assets
abroad (including "payments" of interest on rescheduled debts held by
U.S. banks), while paying $68 billion. Hence last year again the
United States could still use investment income to finance at least part
of its shortfall of goods exports behind goods imports.
Now, however, as the United States becomes a net debtor, it will
have to produce more than it consumes (and invests) if it is not to spiral
explosively into ever greater indebtedness relative to the economy's
productive capacity. What makes this prospect all the more problematic is
that the United States has not been using the bulge in financial capital inflows
to facilitate a bulge in the formation of either physical or human capital—12—
resources, as rapidly developing countries typically do. As Table 4
shows, U.S. investment in productive physical capital has been below average
during these years, nor has spending for research and development or for
education shown any unusual strength. Instead of mortgaging part of the
future income from its investments a familiar activity that may or
may not be sensible, depending upon the relative returns and the
associated risks involved —theUnited States has been mortgaging its
future income in order to finance a combination of government and private
consumption.
Finally, the increasing accumulation of foreign asset holdings in
the United States can significantly affect U.S. financial markets, and hence
the resulting outcomes for U.S. economic activity more broadly, in still
another way. Because the capital inflow required to finance today's U.S.
export—import imbalance is so large, foreign holdings of U.S. assets are
rising not just in relation to U.S. holdings of assets abroad but also
in relation to the overall size of the U.S. financial markets. Throughout
the 1960s total foreign asset holdings in the United States (including
foreign direct investment) represented only some 3% of the total of
financial assets held and traded in U.S. markets.6 As Table 6 shows,
the share of U.S. financial assets held by foreign investors has risen
rapidly since then, and it is continuing to do so. As of yearend 1984
7
foreign holdings accounted for nearly 7% of all U.S. financial assets.
This increasing foreign ownership of U.S. financial assets will
affect the equilibrium of asset prices and asset returns determined in
U.S. markets, and hence also affect U.S. nonfinancial economic activity,
unless foreign investors turn out to exhibit portfolio preferences
identical to those of American investors. When the investors who collectively
hold the assets in any market are heterogenous, in general the resultingTABLE 6
FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF U.S. FINANCIAL ASSETS, 1960-1984










Notes: Amounts in billions of dollars, at yearend.
Foreign holdings exclude gold and SDR, and include interbank claims
net of foreign interbank liabilities.
U.S. market size includes foreign plus all domestic nonfinancial sectors.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.—13—
equilibrium set of asset prices and returns is some weighted combination
of the equilibrium prices and returns that would result if each group,
in turn, uniquely constituted the entire market. For example, as Lintner (1969)
showed, when investors have differing degrees of risk aversion the resulting
equilibrium price of risk is a weighted (harmonic) mean of each investor's
own degree of risk aversion, with the weights corresponding to each investor's
relative share of total asset holdings. Changes in different investors'
relative market importance in this sense therefore lead to changes in the
overall market price of risk.
More generally, if the market consists of investors, indexed by i,
each of whose single—period asset preferences are of the form
=W. (Bre +r ) (1) —itit it —t—it
whereAD is a vector of asset demands (satisfying AD i=W),Wis the investor's
total wealth, is a vector of expected asset returns, and B and Tr are,
respectively, a matrix and a vector of coefficients determined by the investor's
risk preferences and assessments of the risks associated with the various
available assets,8 then the asset market partial equilibrium condition
(2)
for vector A8 of asset supplies outstanding, determines the market
clearing structure of expected asset returns as
e=(> w.B,)l (AS -) w r, ). (3)
itit —t it —it 1 i
Ifinvestors' risk preferences and/or risk assessments differ, then the
nonproportionate growth of different investors' wealth positions over
C)
time changes the resulting asset return structure.—14—
Foreign investors in U.S. asset markets may exhibit portfolio
preferences different from those of American investors fora variety of
easily understandable reasons. First, in a world still of limited
(though increasing) capital mobility, the relevant set of available assets
for foreign investors differs from the corresponding set for lmericans.
Because of the consequent differences in the set of relevant asset return
covariances, even the same assets may have different risk properties as
seen by the two respective groups of investors. Second, investorswith
incomes largely originating in different countries' face different sets of
macroeconomic risks, due to their respective countries' differing policy
regimes, industrial structures, dependence on imported oil and other raw
materials, and other analogous characteristics. Again, even identical assets
may therefore have different risk characteristics from the perspectiveof
investors in different countries. Third, there is no reason to expect such
aspects of underlying preferences as risk aversion to be uniform across
countries with widely differing societal structures and traditions.
For any or all of these reasons, foreign investors participating
in the U.S. financial markets may prefer either more or less risky assets
overall, may prefer either more debt securities or more equity securities,
may prefer either more long—term or more short-term debt, or may prefer
either more volatile or less volatile equities, in comparison to Zmerican
investors. If so, then the rapidly increasing share of U.S. financial
assets held by foreign investors implies that their portfolio preferences
will assume greater importance —inthe sense of equation (3), foreign
investors' wwillrise, relative to that for U.S. investors —in
1
determining the yield and price relationships that prevail in U.S.
markets.—15—
Table7compares the composition of foreign holdings of U.S.
financial assets to the corresponding composition of financial asset
holdings by all domestic U.S. investors, for yearend 1984.11 Although
the absence of foreign ownership of some specific assets stands out,
the rough outlines of the two aggregate portfolios are quite similar.
The respective fractions invested in equities, for exaniple, are within
four percentage points.12 Similarly, the respective fractions invested
in bank—issued claims (plus currency) are essentially identical.
The most significant difference between foreign and U.S. financial
asset holdings shown in Table 7 is in the maturity composition of debt
instruments. As of yearend 1984 foreign investors held $152 billion of
short-term debt instruments issued in U.S. markets (including negotiable
time deposits, but excluding checkable deposits and currency) versus $183
billion of long-term instruments, for a roughly 5-to-6 short-to-long
maturity structure. Determining the analogous ratio for domestic investors
is more problematic because of the unavailability of current data on the
13
maturity composition of the relevant holdings of U.S. Government securities,
but a plausible inference based on what data are available suggests that
the corresponding totals for domestic investors are $1.4 trillion of
short—term debt instruments versus $4.1 trillion of long—term instruments,
for a 1—to-3 short—to-long maturity structure.
If foreign investors continue to represent an increasing share of
U.S. financial asset holdings, and if their portfolio preferences remain
unchanged, over time the market clearing relationship among asset returns
is therefore likely to require a greater premium of expected returns on long—term
debts over expected returns on short—term debts than has been the case on
average in the past. Such a change in the prevailing structure of interest rates
(and asset returns more generally) will not only bear a variety of implicationsTABLE 7
FOREIGN VERSUS DOMESTIC HOLDINGS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, 1984
Foreign Holders Domestic Holders
Amount %of Total Amount% of Total
Checkable Deposits and Currency $19.7 4.4% $582.2 7.1%
Large Time Deposits 39.4 8.8 392.3 4.8
Short-term U.S. Government Securities 72.0 16.0
1,709.5 20.8
Long—term U.S. Government Securities 120.8 26.9
Other Short—Term Paper 40.9 9.1 266.4 3.2
Corporate Bonds 61.8 13.8 588.1 7.2
State—Local Government Securities 0.0 0.0 543.6 6.6
Mortgages 0.0 0.0 2,028.9 24.7
Corporate Equities 94.5 21.0 2,090.3 25.5
Total 449.1100.0 8,201.31)0.0
Notes: Amounts in billions of dollars, at yearend.
Short—term U.S. Government securities include marketable securities only.
Other short—term paper includes commercial paper and bankers acceptances.
Foreign holdings of corporate equities exclude foreign direct investment.
Totals exclude small time and saving deposits, money market mutual funds,
interbank claims, and other miscellaneous assets.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.-16--
within the U.S. financial markets —forexample, for the relative
attractiveness of different forms of saving, and hence of different kinds
of saving institutions —butalso, and more importantly, exert effects
on U.S. nonfinancial economic activity. In particular, evidence on both
business and household financing patterns suggests that such a widening
of average maturity premiums, if not offset by other factors, is likely
in turn to shift the composition of aggregate demand away from fixed
capital formation toward other applications.14 Hence it will further
compound the economy's recent problem of poor investment performance shown
in Table 4.—17--
III.What if the Capital Inflow Doesn't Continue?
The entire question of implications following from a continuing massive
inflow of foreign capital into the United States will, of course, become
moot if the capital inflow soon shrinks —thatis, if the United States
managesto regain a much greater degree of balance between its exports and
itsimports. A decline in the real exchange value of the dollar, due either
to a shift in the mix of U.S. fiscal and monetary policies or to a change
in international portfolio preferences, is probably the most obvious
development that would bring about such an outcome. There are other possibilities
too, however. For example, U.S. producers could become more competitive
abroad, even at the current dollar exchange rate, if they developed new products
eagerly sought by foreign buyers, or if trade negotiations succeeded in
lessening restrictions impeding U.S. exports. Alternatively, U.S. producers
could regain domestic sales if additional protectionist measures enacted by
the United States further excluded foreign imports.'5
In light of the increasingly important role played by the net
capital inflow in the U.S. balance of saving and investment, discussed at
length in Section I, any imminent shrinkage of this inflow would have
serious repercussions for major aspects of U.S. economic activity. Even
so, unraveling those repercussions is far from straightforward. For
example, as Section I notes, the business press has recently emphasized
the role of the capital inflow in financing the federal government's budget
deficit. The standard implication drawn in such evaluations is that, in
the absence of the capital inflow, the government deficit would absorb a
larger share of domestic net private saving, leaving less available to
finance domestic capital formation. Whether such an outcome would in fact
follow from a shrinking of the capital flow, however, depends crucially on
what caused the capital flow to shrink in the first place. If the exogenous—18—
event at the beginning of the causal chain were a return to the typical
pre-l980sfiscal policy, for example, then the smaller budget deficit
would itself offset all or part of the lost foreign capital.
In evaluating such questions, therefore, it is essential not only
to separate what is exogenous from what is endogenous but also to specify
clearly the exact experiment under consideration. The most useful way
to begin in doing so is with the balance of saving and investment in the
form implicit from Table 4 (excluding the statistical discrepancy)
PS =DI+GD+Fl (4)
where PS is net private saving, DI is net private domestic investment,
GD is the combined deficit of federal and all state and local governments,
and Fl is net foreign investment (that is, the negative of the foreign
capital inflow). Because this identity must hold at all times, no one
of the four variables indicated can vary without a precisely offsetting
variation in one or more of the other three. More specifically, in the
context of thought experiments in which all four of these variables are
endogenous, no exogenous shock —neithera change in U.S. fiscal and
monetary policies, nor a change in foreign investors' willingness to
hold dollar assets —canaffect any one of the four without affecting
one or more of the others in a precisely offsetting way.
Table 8 indicates the nature of these offsetting movements in the
respective elements of the balance of saving and investment in response to
U.S. fiscal and monetary policies, based on seasonally adjusted quarterly
data spanning 1970-84. The first column of the table reports results from
ordinary—least-squares regressions of the form
3
=c.+ >3. FP +U (5) it 1j=0ijt—j itTABLE 8
ESTIMATEDEFFECTS ON THE BALANCE OF SAVING AND INVESTMENT
Dependent Variable Independent Variable
FP MP
PS: —.09 (—0.4) —10.42 (—2.7)
-.68 (-2.9) 3.72 (8.0)
3
SE(R2) 1.10 (.08) .79 (.53)
DI: -1.24 (—3.6) —18.78 (—2.6)
—.80 (—2.1) 6.38 (7.5)
SE (R2) 1.74 (.28) 1.45 (.50)
GD: 1.48 (5.9) 9.48 (1.4)
13j
.86 (3.2) -4.68 (—5.7)
SE (2) 1.26 (.49) 1.39 (.38)
Fl:
f3, —.31 (—2.0) 1.17 (0.3)
5 —.86 (—5.4) 2.07 (5.0)
SE (R2) .70 (.39)
Notes: Estimation results for ordinary—least-squares regressions of form
3
=a+j0j x_ + u
for y =PS,DI, GD, Fl and x =FP,MP.
Quarterly data, 1970:Ql -l984:Q4,seasonally adjusted.
Numbers in parentheses by coefficient estimates are t-statistics.
All variables except MP stated as percentages of GNP.
Definitions of variable symbols:
PS =netprivate saving
DI =netprivate domestic investment
GD =federalplus state—local government deficit
Fl =netforeign investment
FP =high—employmentfederal deficit
MP =logarithmof trend—adjusted ratio of money stock to GNP—19—
where y. is in turn each of the four saving or investment variables shown
in equation (4) ,measuredas a percentage of gross national product; FP is
the federal government budget deficit calculated on a 6% unemployment basis, and
also measured as a percentage of gross national product;'6 c. and the 13. 1
are fixed coefficients to be estimated, and u. is a disturbance
1
term corresponding to y. .Foreach of the four regressions, the table
1
3
presents only partial results consisting of the estimated and tO13j'
the associated t—statistic, and the standard error of estimate (and
associated R
2
The second column reports analogous results for regressions
of the form
3
y. =c.+ 13MP + U (6) it 1J=O iJt— it
where MP is a monetary policy index indicating the logarithm of the (quadratic)
trend-adjusted value of the Ml money stock relative to gross national
product.17
Because of the restriction imposed by the identity in equation (4)









and z is any vector of driving variables, necessarily satisfy the "adding—up't
conditions—20—
â'l =.'l=u'1 =0 (9) ——---j—--t—
where.isthe j—th column of matrix 918 As comparison down the two columns
of Table 8 shows, after appropriate sign changes the two sets of values and
. valuessatisfy these conditions to within the accuracy implied by the
33
omission of the statistical discrepancy.
The two sets of regression results reported in Table 8 therefore indicate
answers to the question of how the elements of the U.S. balance of saving
and investment vary together, based on two separate thought experiments.
First, what if the driving variable is a change in U.S. fiscal policy, as
represented by an increase in the high-employment federal deficit relative
to gross national product? As the values in the first column show, the
overall actual government deficit responds immediately and sharply to the
high-employment deficit; with essentially no response in private saving, the
immediate result is both to "crowd out" domestic investment =—1.24)
and, to a much lesser extent, to "draw in" foreign capital FI = — .31)19
The corresponding one—year cumulative effects of a change in fiscal
policy tell a roughly similar story, albeit with some interesting differences.
Over a year private saving declines (p5,j =-.68).The crowding out
of domestic investment becomes smaller DI,j -.80),while the impact on
the foreign capital inflow becomes larger FI,j =— .86),so that after a
year the two effects are of approximately equal magnitude. Overall, the entire
set of estimates broadly corresponds to the U.S. experience thus far during
the 1980s. Read in the opposite direction, they provide a plausible enough
first answer to the question of what would happen as the result of a
tightening of U.S. fiscal policy.
The. second column of Table 8 tells a roughly analogous story about
the effects of an easing of U.S. monetary policy.20 The estimated immediate
impact of greater money growth is to depress both private saving and—21—
domestic investment; the accompanying effects on the government deficit
and on net foreign investment are insignificantly different from zero.2'
Over a year an easier monetary policy stimulates private saving Ps,j =3.72)
and stimulates domestic investment by much more DIj =6.38).Because
the government deficit narrows =—4.68),however, net foreign
investment increases in other words, the capital inflow becomes smaller
FI,j =2.07).
tjnivariate regressions like those reported in Table 8 do not
clearly separate the effects of fiscal and monetary policies because
they do not hold one policy constant while analyzing the other. Table 9
presents corresponding partial results (for convenience, omitting
the initial impact estimates) from ordinary—least—squares regressions of
the form
3 3 3
y. =O.+ .). .EX +•y.RE + S..MP +u• (10) it 1j=Oi:it—jj=O ijt—jj=O ii t—jit
whereEX and RE are federal government expenditures and revenues, respectively,
with both calculated on a 6% unemployment basis and measured as percentages
of gross national product, and all other variables are as in equations (5)
and (6).22 The underlying sample again consists of seasonally adjusted
quarterly data spanning 1970-84.
On balance, the one—year cumulative effects of fiscal and monetary
policies reported in Table 9 are consistent with the separate effects reported
in Table 8, although fewer of these effects are statistically significant in
the multivariate context. Over a year the partial effect of greater high-
employment federal government expenditures is to enlarge the overall actual
government deficit with essentially no offsetting increase in private saving.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a much lesser extent (and not significantly) ,todraw in foreign capital
(>FI,j =-.23).Thepartial effect of greater high-employment federal
government revenues is to enlarge the overall actual government deficit by
much less than one—for—one, although again with no increase in private saving.23
The result is primarily to increase net foreign investment =.85)
and, to a lesser extent (and not significantly) ,tocrowd out investment
=-.35).Finally, the partial effect of more rapid money growth
is primarily to stimulate both private saving = 5.00)and
domestic investment (_= 2.02).Toa roucTh approximation, these
results again correspond to the now familiar analysis of the deterioration
of the U.S. trade balance and of U.S. capital formation in the 1980s, in
terms of the radical turn during this period in the U.S. fiscal-monetary
policy mix.
Apart from a change in U.S. fiscal or monetary policy, the most
obvious possible cause of a decline in the real dollar exchange rate —
andhence a narrowing of the U.S. trade deficit and a corresponding
shrinkage of the foreign capital inflow is a change in the willingness
of foreign investors to hold dollar denominated assets.24 Even so, carrying
out an analysis of the effects of shifting foreign portfolio preferences
corresponding to the analysis of fiscal and monetary policies in Tables 8
and 9 is highly problematic. Presumably, foreign investors' asset preferences
respond to a variety of influences —forexample, both interest rates
and exchange rates —thatin turn either directly depend on the outcomes
for the major elements of the saving—investment balance or, at the least,
are jointly determined with them. To the extent that such codetermination
is present, such variables are not valid right—hand—side variables in any
system like equation (8), and the resulting estimates would be biased.—23—
What would be necessary, instead as in the analysis of fiscal
and monetary policies —isto identify some genuinely exogenous
influence to serve as the initial point of the causal chain constituting
the thought experiment at issue. If some exogenous factor increases the
aggregate demand for net dollar assets, therefore leads to a rise in the
dollar exchange rate, therefore leads to a larger trade deficit,
therefore leads to a large net capital inflow, and therefore affects some
or all of the other elements in the U.S. balance of saving and investment,
it is that exogenous factor —notthe capital inflow, nor the trade
deficit, nor the exchange rate —whichconstitutes the valid right—hand-side
variable for these purposes. Unfortunately, attempts along these lines
based on two separate approaches, both aimed at isolating independent
components of movements in either exchange rates or interest rate
differentials, proved insufficient.25 A structural modeling approach,
like that applied by Sachs (1985), is apparently necessary to unravel
the effects of shifts in foreign portfolio preferences.—24—
Iv. Summary of Conclusions
The rapidly growing net inflow of capital from abroad, mirroring the
extraordinary deterioration of the U.S. export—import balance, has played
a major role in equilibrating overall saving and investment in the United
States in the face of unprecedentedly large and persistent federal governmei±
budget deficits during the 1980s. As of mid-decade, this capital inflow is
more than half as large as the total net saving of the United States. By
relying on it in this way, the United States has already dissipated the
positive net international investment position it had built up over the
previous seven decades. On the current trajectory, the United States will
soon be the world's leading debtor nation.
Because of the sheer size of the foreign capital inflow, the share of
U.S. financial assets held by foreign investors is also growing rapidly.
To the extent that foreign investors' portfolio preferences differ from
those of U.S. investors, their increasing relative importance in this
sense will change the equilibrium price and yield relationships determined
in U.S. markets. The most readily apparent difference between foreign and
domestic patterns of asset holdings in this regard is that foreign
investors, on average, hold far less of their portfolios in long—term
debt instruments and, correspondingly, far more of their portfolios in
short—term debt instruments, than do American investors. The increasing
share of foreign ownership of U.S. financial assets is therefore likely
to raise the expected return premium on long—term debt, and hence
to shift the composition of U.S. financial activity away from capital
formation.
The foreign capital inf low —andwith it the U.S. export-import
balance —may change in response to a variety of possible influences,
including especially either fiscal and monetary policies in the United States or—25--
shifts in foreign investors' portfolio preferences for dollar assets versus
assets denominated in other currencies. Empirical estimates indicate
that a tightening of U.S. fiscal policy would significantly stimulate
U.S. capital formation as well as shrink the U.S. capital inflow (that
is, improve the U.S. export-import balance) .Similarestimates indicate
that an easing of U.S. monetary policy would also significantly stimulate
capital formation and shrink the capital inflow. The difficulty of
isolating genuinely independent movements of exchange rates and
international interest rate differentials precludes deriving similar
estimates for the analogous effects of a shift in portfolio preferences.Footnotes
*This paper was prepared for a conference on "How Open Is the U.S. Economy?"
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October 11-12, 1985.
I am grateful to Ken Weiller for research assistance; to him as well as
Andrew Abel, John Huizinga, Peter Kenen, Jeffrey Sachs and Lawrence Summers
for helpful discussions; and to the National Science Foundation and the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for research support.
1. The statistical discrepancy in the national income accounts is not the
same as that in the balance of payments accounts.
2. Data indicating the split between net business investment in plant and
equipment and net residential investment, within the $176 total shown
in Table 3, are not yet available. Extrapolations based on prior
years' allocation of the relevant depreciation flows suggests that
each component probably represented about one—half of the total.
3. See again footnote 2.
4. Growth of output per manhour in the U.S. economy's nonfarmbusiness
sector averaged 2.7% per annum during 1948-65, but then declined to
1.8% per annum during 1966-77. Productivity then remained flat
during 1978-82. Despite the usual cyclical increase at the outset
of the current business expansion, productivity growthduring the
expansion to date (l983:Ql —l985:Q2)has averaged 2.3% per annum,
actually somewhat below the comparable average for prior post—war
expansions.
5. Other problems of asset valuation and reportingsuggest that the data
in Table 5 may over- or under-estimate the U.S. position. Thesedata
value U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment
in the United States at cost, and hence presumably undervalueboth,
but the former exceeds the latter by a large margin ($233 billion
versus $160 billion at yearend 1984). Similarly, the data value
U.S. gold holdings ($12 billion at yearend 1984) at only $42.22per
ounce. Yet another potential problem, of course, is the accumulation
of unreported flows in both directions. The accumulated statistical
discrepancy since 1970 has been a $150 billion inflow, part of which
has probably been a capital inflow.
6. Even this low percentage represents a small overstatement in that
foreign direct investment ($7 billion out of the S4l billion total
for 1960, for example) includes some real estate holdings, while the
comparison base consists of financial claims only.
7. The totals shown in Table 6 are smaller than the foreignholdings shown
in Table 5 for several reasons, especially the netting of interbank
claims. Other differences include the treatment of U.S. corporations'
borrowing abroad via Netherlands Antilles subsidiaries and (since 1981)
the operation of U.S. banks' international banking facilities; Isard
and Stekler (1985) have shown that adjusting for these factors (especially
IBFs) substantially diminishes the apparent accumulation of foreign claims
during 1981-82, but does so to a much less extent thereafter.8. The linear homogeneous form in (1) follows, for example, from the
assumptions of constant relative risk aversion and joint normally (or
lognorinally) distributed asset return assessments. If all assets are
risky, for example, the specific relationship is
B =- [l-(I Q11)1-l' Q1]
=(1'
where p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion andis the
variance—covariance matrix associated with re. See Friedman and Roley
(forthcoming) for further details of the derivation and underlying
assumptions.
9.See Friedman (1982) for an analysis along these lines in a general
equilibrium model (that is, including simultaneous determination
of financial and nonfinancial market outcomes) ,butin a closed—
economy context.
10. In terms of the familiar generalization of the capital asset
pricing model due to Breeden (1979), the point is simply that
the consumption stream to be hedged is typically different for
residents of different countries.
11.Foreign holdings here exclude $154 billion of foreign direct investment,
as well as a variety of miscellaneous claims that are not typically
traded in the market (for example, $23 billion of trade credit)
Domestic holdings analogously exclude claims not typically traded (for
example, $633 billion of trade credit, and $1.7 trillion of small time
and saving deposits).
12. Note again, however, the exclusion of $154 of foreign direct investment.
13. In 1982 the U.S. Treasury discontinued the regular Treasury Survey of
Ownership.
14. See, for example, the results in Friedman (1982). Moreover, this
factor acting to enlarge the maturity premium on long—term debts
will work in the same direction as the independent changes in
risk structures analyzed by Bodie et al. (1984).
15. In the case of U.S. protectionism, the ultimate effect on the U.S.
trade balance would, of course, depend on the absence of a like
response by foreign countries.
16. It is not in general the case that government expenditures and revenues
have just offsetting effects, so that on purely a priori grounds it
is more appealing to present results for expenditures and revenues
separately, rather than for the deficit as in Table 8. Nevertheless,
regressions corresponding to those in Table 8, but using as independent
variable either government expenditures or government revenues (both
calculated on a 6% unemployment basis) uniformly exhibit larger
standard errors than those reported in Table 8 based on the deficitvariable. By contrast, the multiple regressions reported in Table 9
below treat expenditures and revenues separately.
17. The variable is the residual from the ordinary—least—squares regression
Ml 2 ln =1t
+
132t
Iam grateful to Ken Weiller for the use of this variable; see
Weiller (1985)
18. The analogy to the basic insight of Brainard and Tobin (1968) is
readily apparent.
19. The greater than one-for—one response of both the overall deficit and
domestic investment is surprising. These current—quarter results
probably reflect simultaneity biases, due,for example, to the use
of fiscal policy for purposes of countercyclical stabilization; see
the discussion of such biases in Goldfeld and Blinder (1973)
20. The absolute magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are larger
here, because the MP variable is a logarithm rather than a percentage
of GNP.
21. Here, too, the estimated current—quarter effects presumably reflect
simultaneity biases, including the countercyclical use of monetary
policy as well as the endogeneity of the money stock in the usual
sense; see again Goldfeld and Blinder (1973)
22. Here, unlike in the results for equation (5) reported in Table 8,
treating government expenditures and revenues separately leads
to regressions with smaller standard errors, in three of the four
cases, than those for analogous regressions combining the two into
a single deficit variable.
23. The unresponsiveness of private saving to government expenditures
or government revenues in these estimates (and, still worse if it
were credible, the finding of a negative response of private saving
to the deficit in Table 8) is a manifestation of the now familiar
empirical contradiction of the Barro (1974) hypothesis. For a
recent more detailed look at the evidence on this issue, see Blinder
and Deaton (forthcoming)
24. Marris (1985a, 1985b), in particular, has emphasized this prospect.
25. The first of these approaches attempted to isolate the component of
the movement of exchange rates or interest rate differentials that
is not attributable either to ordinary U.S. business fluctuations
or to variations in U.S. fiscal and monetary policies, and hence that
may plausibly represent other exogenous influences like changing
portfolio preferences. The method used was to proxy these influences
by the residuals from preliminary regressions relating exchange rates
or interest rate differentials to the FP and MP variables used in
equations (5) and (6) ,togetherwith the U.S. unemployment rate,
growth rate of real GNP, and inflation rate. The second approach
focused more directly on foreign fiscal and monetary policies byusing the fitted values from preliminary regressions relating exchange
rates or interest rate differentials to indexes of foreign fiscal
and monetary policies, analogous to the FP and MP variables, constructed
on a GNP-weighted basis for six non—U.S. countries.References
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